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TRUTH AS THE FIRST CASUALTY: 
MAINSTREAM MEDIA PORTRAYAL OF THE GULF WAR 
 
 
James Winter 
University of Windsor 
 
 
        Abstract.  Mainstream news media coverage of 
     the Persian Gulf War is examined in a case study 
     comparison of the conflicting perspectives of 
     political economy and (U.S.) cultural studies as 
     typified by John Fiske. 
 
        The media presented a united front on the U.S. 
     political, economic, and military goals in the 
     war.  As such, they formed an indispensable part 
     of the State apparatus, omitting perspectives 
     which are fundamental to a counter-hegemonic 
     perspective. 
 
        Journalists and the news media generally 
     accomplished the foregoing in two ways.  First, 
     they mainly relayed the perspective of the U.S. 
     administration, including its military and 
     academic collaborators, in an isolated and 
     uncritical fashion.  This was done to the 
     exclusion of the alternative perspectives 
     elaborated herein.  Second, they adopted this 
     dominant perspective as their own view, and passed 
     that along to viewers with resultant heightened 
     credibility. 
 
        This paper places the Persian Gulf crisis and 
     war within a broader political, economic and 
     historical framework.  It adopts a critical 
     perspective on the mainstream media framing which 
     limited reality to the "common sense" range of the 
     dominant ideology. 
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     To parody the words of Winston Churchill, never 
     have so many been manipulated so much, by so few. 
     (Aldous Huxley, 1958)[1] 
 
     It was early March, 1991, and at the Michigan State 
fairgrounds, a 23-year veteran Detroit TV reporter was 
signing autographs for several fans who assigned him star 
status.  The occasion was a welcome home ceremony for 
Captain Steven Tait, USAF, a Michigan resident and the first 
pilot to shoot down an Iraqi fighter jet in the Gulf War. 
Addressing the crowd, Tait said: 
 
     On the war effort itself, I think we contributed 
     two things.  The top military leaders did an 
     outstanding job.  The other thing that was 
     successful was the technology that we had and it's 
     the taxpayers out there that buy the technology 
     that we need to do that!  (Applause)[2] 
 
     A Vietnam veteran interviewed by the reporter was 
somewhat disgruntled.  Partially echoing U.S.  President 
George Bush, he said that in Vietnam, "We had our hands tied 
behind our backs because of the politicians."  (This was 
only a partial echo, because Bush also tended to blame the 
media and the public for the U.S.  "failure" in Vietnam.) 
 
     The next day, Sunday, the assignment editor told a 
student observer that there was "not much going on today. 
We need to formulate stories, but not make them up.  If you 
have any ideas, let me know."  She sent the same veteran 
reporter to yet another "Welcome Home Troops" rally (this 
time in Taylor, Michigan), where he interviewed a soldier in 
uniform about the reaction the troops were getting at home. 
Afterwards, the reporter learned that the young man never 
went to the Gulf, but was ready to leave "on a moment's 
notice."  For the on-air TV news story, the message, "Almost 
served in the Gulf" was superimposed over the video footage 
of the soldier's interview. 
 
     Maybe Andy Warhol was right after all: everyone gets to 
be famous for 15 minutes. 
 
     The reporter too, mimicked Bush, when in his "stand-up" 
at the end of the news clip he said: "Many here agree with 
President Bush when he says the Vietnam syndrome is over." 
 
     The media generally also appeared to subscribe to 
Bush's interpretation of the Vietnam syndrome, and did their 
best to overcome it too. 
 
                   Theoretical Framework 
 
     The primary focus of this paper is on the degree to 
which the information presented in mainstream media 
reflected the explanations and interpretations offered by 
the U.S. military and administration regarding the events in 
the Persian Gulf in 1990-91.  I will examine these events 
and the media's role in light of two competing theories, 
which I have chosen to call the "normative consensus" 
theory, versus the notions of journalistic empowerment and 
consequent theory of "media pluralism." 
 
     The normative consensus view holds that along with 
other major cultural institutions, the media serve to 
"construct an order that is consonant with the needs and 
interests of dominant groups" and which "has the ideological 
effect of reproducing hegemony."[3] This latter concept is 
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attributed to the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci, who 
explicated it in the following fashion: 
 
     Corporate interests, in their present and future 
     development, transcend the corporate limits of the 
     merely economic group, and can and must become the 
     interests of other subordinate groups.  This is 
     the most purely political phase, and marks the 
     decisive passage from the structure to the sphere 
     of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in 
     which previously germinated ideologies become 
     "party," come into confrontation and conflict, 
     until only one of them, or at least a single 
     combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the 
     upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole 
     social area - bringing about not only a unison of 
     economic and political aims, but also intellectual 
     and moral unity, posing all the questions around 
     which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on 
     a "universal" plane, and thus creating the 
     hegemony of a fundamental social group over a 
     series of subordinate groups.[4] 
 
     With regard to the role of the media specifically, 
Armand Mattelart has summed this up as, "...when the media 
actually begin to function as an integral part of the State 
apparatus,"[5] a notion which is closely linked to Gramsci's 
description of the media as a "hegemonic apparatus."  In the 
recent communication literature, this position is 
represented by those who may be combined for purposes of 
convenience and brevity under the label of political 
economists.[6] 
 
     In contrast, the pluralistic view of journalistic (and 
audience) empowerment hold that there is a competing elite 
structure which leads to "ideological conflict" in the 
media.[7] As Ericson, et al. conclude: 
 
     Contrary to the dominant normative view in the 
     academic literature that journalism is 
     characterized by consensus among its 
     practitioners, we found persistent and pervasive 
     differences, divisions, and conflict.  Editors 
     struggled to control...  Reporters asserted their 
     autonomy...  This activity ensured that there was 
     real equivocality, and openings for discovery and 
     alternatives, in their work.[8] 
 
     The pluralist stance was exemplified by the late 
Canadian sociologist John Porter, in his classic text, The 
Vertical Mosaic (1965).  Porter's examination of census data 
contradicted the "Horatio Alger" myth of the self-made man, 
and as such undermined notions of individual determinism. 
However, similar to Ericson, et al., and others in the 
current literature, although he recognized the role of the 
media in the "ideological system," i.e., maintenance of the 
social structure, Porter saw that system as associated with 
but distinct from other power systems.  He argued that the 
media and other components of that system provide the 
justification for separate political, social and economic 
systems.  In short, he envisioned a pluralist, competing 
elite structure.[9] 
 
     Porter's student Wallace Clement, in The Canadian 
Corporate Elite (1975) and works since then, differs. 
Clement drew on C. Wright Mills and Ralph Miliband to argue 
that the media in general and the press in particular do not 
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constitute a free, open, or diverse marketplace, any more 
than does the marketplace generally.  Instead, the free 
marketplace of ideas is an unattained ideal, the myth of 
which serves to legitimate existing monopoly power and class 
privilege.[10] 
 
     Clement argued that rather than having a pluralistic 
society of competing elites, we have a monolithic elite 
system.  He provided evidence of considerable overlap 
between the media and economic elites, concluding that "in 
large part, they are the same people,"[11] thus buttressing 
his position that the monopoly of a few dominant sources has 
put an end to diversity and the so- called "open market" 
situation.[12] 
 
     Thus, Clement argued that if the function of the media 
is to relay or translate information for the public, they 
must be autonomous from other elites if they are to do this 
in a detached and objective manner.  They must be part of 
the pluralist system described by Porter.  His research, 
however, indicated that they are not. 
 
     One outcropping of the pluralist view held by Porter 
and others is the "cultural studies" rubric, perhaps 
typified by Stuart Hall in the British school, and John 
Fiske in the U.S.  In Fiske's view, mainstream media 
constitute "polysemic texts that can be read in different 
ways." 
 
     "Dallas" is a remarkably "open" program: Rick 
     Altman's description of it as a "menu" from which 
     various, differently socially situated viewers 
     choose different "meals" is a productive one.  It 
     is certainly much more productive than seeing the 
     text as a singular determinate, closing down its 
     meanings and producing a singular dominant 
     ideology.[13] 
 
     For the most part the research by Fiske and others 
focuses on the process of self-emancipation realized by 
audiences, through "strategies of resistance," a view which 
ultimately proclaims "the people" as "the driving force 
behind the cultural industries."[14] At base, however, it 
can be seen as fundamentally in agreement with the argument 
of Ericson, et al. that the media (by implication, both in 
news and in entertainment) are open and diverse, and 
ultimately with the liberal-pluralist view that all is 
basically right with the media, and consequently with 
democracy. 
 
     In light of the above, my purpose is twofold.  First, I 
will demonstrate how the mainstream media presented 
Gramsci's "unison of political and economic aims" on the 
Persian Gulf War.  Second, I will delineate the (hidden) 
corporate or "State apparatus" interests which were not 
examined by the media, and which are fundamental to a 
counter-hegemonic perspective.  As part of this latter 
process, and in order to contextualize adequately these 
events within the broader framework of political economy, it 
is necessary to elaborate the untold story which was omitted 
from the mainstream news media, 
 
                  The Ubiquitous War Hero 
 
     By the beginning of March, George Bush had declared 
victory.  He also had closed the books on another chapter of 
historical engineering.  "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam 
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syndrome once and for all," Bush gushed in what The New York 
Times described as "a spontanteous [sic] burst of pride" 
following the war.[15] 
 
     This was in keeping with his press conference held to 
announce the war, only hours after the massive bombing of 
Iraqi forces began on January 16.  "This will not be another 
Vietnam," Bush said, evidently promising to deliver public 
support for the war.  "Our troops will have the best 
possible support in the entire world.  They will not be 
asked to fight with one hand tied behind their backs." 
 
     The U.S. dropped 4,600,000 tons of bombs on Vietnam, 
and 400,000 tons of napalm.  They sent 2,150,000 troops to 
Vietnam, of whom 57,900 died while killing 1,921,000 
Vietnamese.[16] So, in what way was the U.S. fighting with 
"one hand tied behind their backs?"  It certainly wasn't for 
a lack of military firepower.  Noam Chomsky has suggested 
that this refers to the Soviet Union as a superpower 
deterrent to unlimited U.S. aggression, a deterrent which 
internal problems in the USSR have since removed.[17] As 
mentioned above, another possibility is the lack of public 
support for a sustained war abroad. 
 
     Bush addressed the troops at his first "welcome home" 
ceremony, in Sumter South Carolina, on St.  Patrick's day. 
"When you left it was still fashionable to question 
America's decency, America's courage, America's resolve," he 
said.  "No one, no one in the whole world doubts us any 
more. [Applause] What you did, you helped us revive the 
America of our old hopes and dreams." 
 
     Bush told the public and troops' families, 
 
     You don't have to wear a uniform to be a war hero. 
     Here, crowded on the bleachers, and out there on 
     the field, are heroes and heroines of all ages. 
     Mothers and fathers, sisters, brothers, children, 
     neighbors, friends... the loved ones and even 
     strangers all across our great country hung out 
     yellow ribbons, unfurled flags, sent letters and 
     gifts... no one understands this magic but it's a 
     kind of blessing that enables good people to 
     accomplish great deeds.[18] 
 
Thus did Bush establish that those at home waving the flag 
were heroes too, and in so doing, he included the public as 
part of the war effort, leaving no room for protest and 
effectively defining non-support for the war out of 
existence. 
 
     In designating the supportive observers as war heroes, 
Bush reinforced the key concept of individual 
determinism.[19] Even as they waved their tiny American 
flags and rose (en masse) to deliver standing ovations, the 
spectators were congratulated on their individual roles.  As 
Mattelart comments, in order to reinforce the "programming" 
under hegemony, 
 
     Each message should reproduce the receiver's 
     status as an isolated individual.  The forms of 
     transmitting reality, the very concept of 
     information in capitalist society, must reproduce 
     this principle which inspires the morals of 
     society, and which makes the individual believe 
     that his well-being depends only on himself.[20] 
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     Parenthetically, various strands of U.S. cultural 
studies do appear to reproduce this principle.  As Garnham 
put it, this work has "moved ever further, not only from 
political economy but from notions of social determination 
in general, to focus on discourse within a relativist, 
largely ahistorical and individualistic frame of 
analysis."[21] Or, as Sholle observed, the audience-centered 
focus of U.S. cultural studies is "dangerously close to 
being incorporated into... conservative political approaches 
and administrative research."[22] 
 
     If audience responses such as ribbons, flags and 
letters are due to individual and inexplicable "magic," then 
this indeed is a "blessing" for Bush's "good people."  It 
may also be self-evident that if we ourselves are 
responsible for everything ranging from our social status to 
the war on Saddam Hussein, then there is no point in looking 
for broader causal factors. 
 
     Vietnam: A Case of Collective Historical Amnesia 
 
     The "Vietnam syndrome" was an underlying theme of the 
Gulf War.  In referring to it, again, Bush appeared to 
signal an (unjustified) lack of public support for the war 
effort.[23] Others viewed it as the public's desire for 
peace.[24] Neither is accurate, although the latter comes 
much closer than the former.  An understanding of 
conflicting interpretations of what happened in Vietnam is 
crucial in order to place the Gulf War in perspective. 
Hence, we will examine the Vietnam syndrome in some detail 
at the outset. 
 
     In documenting their media propaganda model, Herman and 
Chomsky illustrate that the Vietnam war, certainly as seen 
by the official government and mainstream media, and perhaps 
in the public's recollection as well, bears more resemblance 
to a "Rambo" film than to actual events.[25] 
 
     This conventional "common sense"[26] history of Vietnam 
is roughly as follows: In the 1950s, as the French abandoned 
their fight against the communist hordes in Vietnam, the 
U.S. and several allies became involved.  This escalated 
gradually until the U.S. was provoked by the Vietcong, in 
the Tonkin Gulf incident of 1964, into sharply accelerated 
efforts.  U.S. involvement was at the urging of the South 
Vietnam government and people, who opposed the Vietcong and 
communism.  After about four years of heavy involvement, and 
following the communist Tet offensive of 1968, U.S. media 
coverage turned against the war.  Television in particular, 
with its vivid footage of My Lai-type massacres and U.S. 
bodybags, also served to turn public opinion against the 
war.  With the media and the public against them, the 
administration and Pentagon had little recourse but to seek 
"peace with honor." 
 
     According to this perspective, the Vietnam syndrome 
represents the inability of armed forces to win a protracted 
war which is unpopular with the media and the public back 
home.  Even though the goal of the U.S. administration might 
be the altruistic defense of small third world countries 
faced with naked communist aggression, this means nought 
when filtered by the leftist media and opposed by their 
peacenik collaborators. 
 
     A competing interpretation, or what Ralph Nader termed 
a "dissenting ideology" as applied to Vietnam, might be as 
follows: By the late 1940s, U.S. backing of France's 
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post-WW2 attempts to reconquer its Indochina colonies meant 
that the U.S. was aligned against Vietnamese nationalist 
forces struggling for freedom and representing the 
overwhelming majority of the population.  With French 
withdrawal in 1954, the U.S. subverted Geneva agreements 
which laid the groundwork for the unification of Vietnam, 
instead establishing a client state in South Vietnam which 
controlled its population with substantial violence.  In the 
early 1960s, the U.S. bombed South Vietnam in an effort to 
drive millions of people into "strategic hamlets" which were 
no more than barbed- wire concentration camps, and which 
would ostensibly protect the South Vietnamese from communist 
guerrillas whom they were willingly supporting.[27] 
 
     Contrary to the arguments of proponents of the Vietnam 
syndrome, the evidence suggests that it was the U.S. 
government, not the media or the public, which first 
abandoned hopes of a military victory after the 1968 Tet 
offensive. 
 
     The Tet offensive of January 1968 ... convinced 
     U.S. elites that the war was proving too costly to 
     the United States, and that strategy should shift 
     toward a more "capital- intensive" operation with 
     reliance on an indigenous mercenary army (in the 
     technical sense of the phrase) and gradual 
     withdrawal of the U.S. forces, which were by then 
     suffering a severe loss of morale, a matter of 
     growing concern to military authorities.[28] 
 
Thus, the media and eventually the public merely "mirrored 
the changes in elite opinion."[29] Content analyses of the 
period indicate that the media were pro-war.  Polls taken 
indicate that watching TV coverage made the American public 
more rather than less supportive of the war effort up until 
1969, when the focus of media coverage shifted to the Paris 
peace talks.[30] So, rather than media portrayals turning 
public opinion against the war, eventually resulting in low 
troop morale and political pressures which caused the U.S. 
to lose the war, it appears that the media and the public 
merely followed the decisions, attitudes, and lead of the 
administration, Pentagon, elites generally (in the form of 
Johnson's "wise men,") and even the demoralized troops 
themselves. 
 
     Chomsky quotes from a New York Times analysis of the 
debate over the Vietnam War, written much later, which 
stated: 
 
     There are those Americans who believe that the war 
     to preserve a non-Communist, independent South 
     Vietnam could have been waged differently.  There 
     are other Americans who believe that a viable, 
     non-Communist South Vietnam was always a myth.  A 
     decade of fierce polemics has failed to resolve 
     this ongoing quarrel.[31] 
 
     So, the hawks allege that the U.S. could have won, 
while the doves say victory was always beyond their grasp. 
What's missing, says Chomsky, is a third position, based on 
the view that "the United States simply had no legal or 
moral right to intervene in the internal affairs of Vietnam 
in the first place."  The third position exceeds what 
Chomsky calls, "The Bounds of the Expressible," and 
illustrates the genius of "brainwashing under freedom." 
 
     If one rejects the common sense view in favor of the 
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dissenting view, then the question of why the administration 
(successfully) has foisted the former view on us becomes 
paramount.  A logical conclusion seems to be a variation of 
"blaming the victims,"[32] if it is possible to conceive of 
American media and public as victims of the Vietnam war, 
without in any way wishing to downplay the infinitely more 
important case of the Vietnamese victims themselves. 
 
     The media have of course been, perhaps willingly, 
victimized by the flak machine which constitutes the fourth 
filter in Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model.  This is 
all the more evident, as these authors point out, in that 
the two-volume tome constituting the authoritative "proof" 
that the media lost the war through their biased, 
anti-government reporting, was sponsored by Freedom 
House,[33] one of the preeminent organizations which "harass 
the media and put pressure on them to follow the corporate 
agenda and a hard-line, right-wing foreign policy."[34] The 
effectiveness of this approach may be seen in the way the 
media toed the official line in reporting on Nicaragua, 
Panama, Grenada, and as we will see, the Gulf War. 
 
     Mattelart, in referring to Bruno Bettelheim's 
psychoanalytic study of fairy tales (The Uses of 
Enchantment, 1976) says this 
 
     allows us to see how a culture conveyed by the 
     media attempts to deprive the people of its 
     memory.  While giving the illusion of relying on 
     and assuming a patrimony of myths, this culture 
     actually standardizes, serializes and appropriates 
     history, which it mutilates and reduces to a 
     series of miscellaneous news items (faits divers). 
     The greatest standardization is undoubtedly that 
     of historical time. 
 
     Mattelart says the elite class "claims to be universal. 
[I]n order to have its own history appear as 'natural,' and 
the only possible interpretation, it must colonize the 
history of the other classes.  This is the only way it can 
assure its ideological hegemony. . . The 'de-historizing' 
and reduction of history into a series of faits divers 
presides over all of the standards ruling the transmission 
of reality."[35] Clearly, this was in operation vis-a-vis 
the "Vietnam Syndrome," and was used effectively by the U.S. 
administration -- and obediently relayed by the media -- 
during the Gulf War. 
 
     As for the public, the protestations of support for the 
troops at peace rallies, combined with the ubiquitous flag 
waving and yellow ribbons, attest to public guilt and 
remorse over the "doctrinal consensus" on Vietnam.  Three 
further, brief examples are illustrative of the patriotic 
frenzy aroused no doubt in part by this remorse. 
 
     1. In Seton Hall, New Jersey, college basketball 
        player Marco Lokar was hounded back to his 
        native Italy, for refusing to wear the U.S. 
        flag on his uniform.[36] 
 
     2. At a rally held at the SUNY college campus in 
        New Paltz N.Y., to protest the war, professor 
        Barbara Scott urged American military personnel 
        not to kill innocent people.  In the enormous 
        brouhaha following the event, the media dubbed 
        her "Baghdad Barbara," in reference to Tokyo 
        Rose of WW2.  Republican Senator Charles Cook 
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        went so far as to publicly accuse Scott of 
        treason.  Letter campaigns were aimed at the 
        college president and Governor Mario Cuomo, 
        urging them to fire Scott.  Meanwhile, hate 
        mail arrived at her office.[37] 
 
     3. In Kutztown, Pennsylvania, a newspaper editor 
        was fired for his editorial titled, "How about 
        a little peace!"[38] 
 
These examples illustrate that it doesn't pay to be 
"unpatriotic," even if you're not American, or to promote 
peace or oppose the war, in light of the Vietnam syndrome. 
 
     Indeed, coverage of peace demonstrations was 
negligible.  Consumer advocate Ralph Nader commented that 
the peace march held in Washington D.C. on January 26, 1991: 
 
     was probably the biggest citizen demonstration 
     ever [held] in Washington in Winter.  CBS gives 
     them a four-second -- that may be an exaggeration 
     -- scan while someone is saying, "Meanwhile, there 
     were protests on both coasts today."  They didn't 
     interview anybody.  The media have gone to the 
     point where they don't even cover the bizarre, if 
     the bizarre reflects a dissenting ideology.[39] 
 
An estimated 250,000 people took part in this demonstration. 
As of February 1, 1991, there were more than 3200 events 
against the war held in the U.S. alone.[40] Moreover, 
Hodding Carter III, former State department spokesperson for 
the Carter administration, noted that the Bush White House 
was "grousing about coverage of the antiwar demonstrations 
-- which, I would note, was almost nonexistent."[41] 
 
     Thus, there was significant opposition to the war, 
despite the overwhelmingly positive propaganda in favor of 
it in the mainstream media, where public opinion was 
portrayed as being universally in favor of the war and the 
Bush administration.  There is of course no question that 
the vast majority approved of Bush's decision to use force 
against Iraq; the point is that the opposition that did 
exist was under-represented to the point of invisibility. 
 
     However, the "Vietnam syndrome" mindset was evident 
even at anti-war demonstrations and teach-ins, where the 
majority of speakers went out of their way to explain that 
they too "support our troops."  This demonstrates that even 
the so-called "peaceniks" subscribe to, or have been 
influenced by, the Bush administration's version of Vietnam. 
As Z Magazine publisher Michael Albert noted: 
 
     Of course we want them back alive.  But they are 
     Bush's troops insofar as they are soldiers 
     fighting an unjust war.  We cannot support that. . 
     . . Of course I want to help save the ground 
     soldiers from having to kill or be killed.  But I 
     oppose what the ground soldiers are doing.[42] 
 
Noam Chomsky commented in May that: 
 
     Huge media campaigns wielding vacuous slogans to 
     dispel the danger of thought are now a staple of 
     the ideological system.  To derail concern over 
     whether you should support their policy, the PR 
     system focuses attention on whether you support 
     our troops -- meaningless words, as empty as the 
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     question of whether you support the people of 
     Iowa.  That, of course, is just the point: to 
     reduce the population to gibbering idiots, 
     mouthing empty phrases and patriotic slogans, 
     waving ribbons, watching gladiatorial contests and 
     the models designed for them by the PR industry, 
     but, crucially, not thinking or acting.[43] 
 
     It may be argued that the net result was "an almost 
fascist popular culture,"[44] in support of the war effort. 
Mainstream media in Canada and the U.S. played an 
instrumental role in delivering public support for the war 
to Bush and Brian Mulroney, while simultaneously 
misdirecting attention from domestic problems which in 
Canada included Native issues, the Goods and Services Tax, 
the Free Trade Agreement, etc.[45] 
 
     It wasn't only the Americans, with their ubiquitous 
yellow ribbons, who were duped.  Although survey results 
consistently show that only about 20 per cent of Canadians 
say war is justified when other means fail, support for the 
war (option) climbed to 55 per cent after it actually 
began.[46] 
 
     Both voluntary and involuntary censorship supporting 
the war were underway long before it began.  Media hype 
climaxed in an "inevitable" momentum on January 15.  Minutes 
before Bush's deadline to Iraq passed, an American TV news 
anchor said that if an attack didn't follow soon, "there may 
be a certain sense of letdown."[47] 
 
     This gleeful anticipation typifies the mainstream media 
role, which generally may be described as "cheerleading," 
and which served to "anesthetize" the public.  There were a 
number of other characteristics: Naming, or characterizing 
war as peace; Dehumanizing the Iraqis; Demonizing Saddam 
Hussein; Playing up the terrorist threat; Overestimating the 
Iraqi war machine; and claiming war was the Final Resort 
after failed diplomacy.  Finally, the media severely 
restricted the range of debate, by propagating the official 
U.S.  Administration's version of the issue.  There were 
relatively minor exceptions, as is evident from some of my 
mainstream media sources.  But the overwhelming emphasis, 
reflected in public support for the war effort, was on the 
fairytale spun by what Eisenhower dubbed the "military- 
industrial complex."  North Americans were subjected to a 
glut of "infotainment" which totally obscured the real 
picture, replacing it with the "common sense" version 
approved by the Bush administration and its military arm. 
 
     Below, we will outline each of these elements of news 
media portrayals, prior to contextualizing them within a 
broader theoretical framework.  It should be noted at the 
outset, however, that the problem was by no means restricted 
to news coverage.  Star-studded welcome home troop 
extravaganzas, Whitney Houston's video rendition of the U.S. 
national anthem, the Super Bowl halftime show with George 
and Barbara Bush, and talk show host Arsenio Hall, who 
initially opposed the war but eventually appeared draped in 
the U.S. flag, all form an important part of the popular 
media perspective on the war, which is not addressed here. 
This too is in keeping with the hegemonic structure of 
"monopoly culture" outlined by Mattelart. 
 
     We should note in passing that the mass cultures 
     reinforce the mass culture, or rather that the 
     media mutually reinforce each other in order to 
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     repeat ad infinitum the circle of their 
     repetition.[48] 
 
                        What's in a Name? 
 
     To begin with, it was often not even called a "war." 
And, as with Korea and Vietnam, war was never declared.  In 
Vietnam, it was called a "conflict."  But the Newspeak 
dictionary has taken a giant leap forward since then.  War 
has become more sanitized, and surgically clean: an 
"operation."  Toronto Globe and Mail editor-in-chief William 
Thorsell gloated that the Gulf War "was really more of a 
campaign than a war.  It consisted of the largest and best 
targeted bombing campaign in the history of armed conflict. 
The Iraqi side cowered, evaded, endured and finally broke 
under relentless pounding from the air."[49] 
 
     The 1989 invasion and war waged on Panama in search of 
general Manuel Noriega was labeled "Operation Just Cause." 
The War in the Gulf began with operation "Desert Shield," 
and moved to operation "Desert Storm."  Indeed, in May we 
were still reading newspaper stories under the logo, "After 
The Storm."  Of course, storms are both naturally occurring 
and beyond human control.  Today, "wars" are only waged on 
poverty and drugs, not people.  With the language of 
Orwell's Newspeak, the raining of massive death and 
destruction has taken on the surrealistic atmosphere of a 
combination video-game and sports extravaganza. 
 
     As Mattelart notes, in the mass culture typified by 
North America, "The function of [Gramsci's] civil society is 
to render opaque the reality of the repressive, brutal force 
of the class- State by sublimating and disguising it as 
symbolic violence."[50] This contrasts with the more open 
methods adopted in the U.S. client states in Central and 
South America, for example, but which, as Chomsky has 
documented, are "rendered opaque" for the American home 
audience. 
 
     In the St.  Patrick's Day address in Sumter, S.C. 
referred to above, Bush summed up the war by saying "The 
coalition victory in Kuwait" involved the merging of "nine 
allied nations" into "a seamless theatre airforce," which 
conducted "the most intense, most successful air assault in 
history."[51] "That powerful, precise air assault crushed 
Saddam's war machine while sparing innocent Iraqi citizens 
and while saving allied lives," Bush said.  But the media 
not only reported Bush's words, and those of Schwartzkopf 
and others, they also carried video footage or ran special 
sections with full-color diagrams, witnessing their own 
fascination with war technology.  In so doing, they served 
to disguise brutal force as symbolic violence. 
 
     About six months after the war ended, news of American 
atrocities continued to leak out and to be reported with 
alacrity.  The Toronto Globe and Mail, for example, ran a 
story (relegated to page 12) about Iraqi troops buried alive 
by bulldozer tank blades.  Although the story quoted 
Lieutenant- Colonel Stephen Hawkins as saying the burial 
tactic "was designed in part to terrorize the Iraqis into 
surrendering," this was buried in the last two paragraphs of 
the story.  In contrast, a "Kicker" headline quoted a 
Washington spokesman who said "There's no nice way to kill 
somebody in a war."[52] Just as war became a game, so too 
have games become war.  For example, as hockey's Pittsburg 
Penguins reached their first Stanley Cup final, en route to 
becoming NHL champions, the media labeled this, "Operation 
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Ice Storm." 
 
     Operation Ice Storm has entered the ultimate 
     theatre of NHL operations.  Operation Desert 
     Storm, the successful military campaign in the 
     Middle East earlier this year, was the instigation 
     for some Penguins fans to hang an Operation Ice 
     Storm sign in the Civic Arena on Saturday when 
     their conquering heroes defeated the Boston Bruins 
     5-3 to win the Wales Conference championship.[53] 
 
     During the war, the folks back home heard about 
"sorties" or "visits" carried out using smart "ordinances" 
virtually guaranteed to avoid "collateral" damage. 
"Surgical strikes" called up images of diseased tissue being 
removed.  But those "surgical strikes" first were introduced 
in Vietnam, where hundreds of thousands of Indochinese 
villagers perished.  In the Gulf War, about 2000 bombing 
raids were conducted daily on Iraq.  In the first week of 
the air war, the U.S. dropped twice the tonnage of bombs 
dropped on Germany during 1944.  But while media and public 
remained riveted to technical displays of the laser- guided 
wizardry of the Cruise and Patriot missiles, U.S. officials 
later admitted that at best only 60% of the laser- guided 
bombs hit their target, so at least 2 out of 5 missed, 
"sometimes by thousands of feet."[54] U.S.  General Merrill 
McPeak, Air force Chief of Staff, told reporters that the 
guided bombs "hit their targets more than 90 per cent of the 
time."  Even so, "only about one-quarter of the conventional 
bombs... hit their targets.  And the vast majority of the 
bombs used in the war -- almost 93 per cent -- were these 
conventional 'iron' bombs."[55] 
 
     When one of the intended targets turned out to be a 
bomb shelter, hundreds of civilians were killed by the 
"smart" weaponry.  U.S. military spokesmen responded that it 
was Saddam Hussein's fault for nefariously duping civilians 
into hiding in military targets!  This was reminiscent of 
the "they brought it on themselves" logic used by an 
American official in Vietnam: 
 
     What the Vietcong did was occupy the hamlets we 
     pacified just for the purpose of having the allies 
     move in and bomb them.  By their presence, the 
     hamlets were destroyed.[56] 
 
During the coverage of the "bunker incident," one of the 
very few occasions when civilian casualties were mentioned, 
NBC anchor Tom Brokaw intoned, "We must point out again and 
again that it is Saddam Hussein who put these innocents in 
harm's way."[57] 
 
     Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the U.S., 
obtained permission to go into Iraq with a camera crew.  His 
group traveled 2000 miles across Iraq, from February 2 to 
8th, examining civil damage in Baghdad, Basra, and Diwaniya. 
 
     There was no "collateral" military damage; all the 
     destruction was to civilians.  We saw no evidence 
     of military presence in any of the bombed areas we 
     visited.[58] 
 
Clark concluded that, "The air assault deliberately 
targeting the civilian population of Iraq is a war crime." 
 
     In meeting the ultimate qualification for Orwellian 
Newspeak, however, war has been classified as peace.  Bush 
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told the U.S.  Congress that a vote to give him war powers 
offered the best chance for peace, and The New York Times 
intoned, "Congress has armed the President, first and 
foremost, for peace."[59] Canadian External Affairs Minister 
Joe Clark commented that "What the world is doing in the 
Gulf... [is] returning to the notion that peace should not 
only be kept, but made."[60] Defence Minister Bill McKnight 
told the House of Commons on November 30 that Canadian 
forces "are there to enforce the world's condemnation of 
Iraq.  They are there to bring about peace and security in a 
region where it is important."[61] 
 
     Returning to Mattelart, he illustrates the importance 
of naming with an illustration from communication studies as 
a discipline. 
 
     The term "means of communication" is rarely used 
     ... and has been hidden behind the economically 
     and politically neutral terms "communication 
     media," "mass communication media," and 
     particularly "mass media."  Thus the materiality 
     of the means of communications is obfuscated and 
     the immaterial aspects are emphasized.[62] 
 
This point was later emphasized by Dallas Smythe, who 
preferred the term "Consciousness Industries."  The 
obfuscating and misleading use of terms such as "operation," 
which was not only perpetrated by the Bush administration 
but adopted wholesale by the media, is further evidence of 
their perhaps unthinking, but nonetheless tangible, 
complicity. 
 
                  Dehumanizing the Iraqis 
 
     The massive bombing was undertaken and maintained in 
order to crush Iraqi resistance and reduce the number of 
U.S. body bags arriving home: another distasteful image of 
Vietnam.  Of course, in this manner the lives of American 
troops were exchanged for those of thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers and civilians.  This was explained as a simple 
exercise of "degrading the Iraqi army."  This is a "rerun" 
of the enormous casualties and devastation for the 
Vietnamese civilian population in that war.[63] 
 
     One young pilot described the light show over Baghdad 
as the "best I've seen since the fourth of July."  Thus were 
the Iraqis dehumanized.  A U.S. pilot described what it was 
like picking off Iraqi tanks along the Saudi border with 
Kuwait: "It's almost like you flipped on the light in the 
kitchen late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying 
and we're killing them."[64] 
 
     This wasn't an isolated view.  Marine pilot Lieutenant- 
Colonel Dick White, describing for pool reporters what it 
was like to see Iraqi troops in Kuwait from his plane, used 
the same terms, saying "It was like turning on the kitchen 
light late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying. 
We finally got them out where we could find them and kill 
them."[65] In addition, Iraqis were called "camel jockeys," 
and "sand niggers" -- an incredible epithet, given the large 
proportion of Afro-American troops in the Gulf. 
 
     Citing as examples the use of "Japs," "Reds" (for the 
Chinese), and "Vietcong," with its connotation of the Congo 
and Blacks, Leonardo Acosta describes these as 
"word-fetishes with a negative content."[66] Writing in The 
Nation, an observer commented that: 
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     One TV reporter told the nation after the first 
     8000 sorties had pulverized Iraqi forces, "Soon 
     we'll have to stop the air war and start killing 
     human beings."[67] 
 
Like the military, journalists such as this one came to 
subscribe to the view that they were merely shooting fish in 
a barrel.  Credence was lent to this perspective by the 
Pentagon's refusal to release estimates of Iraqi civilian or 
military casualties.  Thus, while television showed film 
footage of ducks immersed in oil slicks, victims of 
Hussein's alleged "eco-terrorism," we were largely denied 
access to the death and destruction wrought on the Iraqi 
people.  Commenting on one segment of Iraqi casualty 
footage, NBC correspondent Dennis Murphy said "Until we get 
some western reporters and photographers in there to vouch 
for it, I think we'll have to call it propaganda."  Anchor 
Garrick Utley agreed, "That's a pretty good name for 
it."[68] 
 
     Earlier, in order to help justify the war, the Iraqi 
people were portrayed in a form of liberation discourse as 
innocent victims of Hussein who had to be saved from him. 
All of this is again reminiscent of Vietnam, as indicated 
above. 
 
     A version of hate crime was perpetrated on 
Arab-Americans, who were subjected to "arson, bomb threats, 
and indiscriminate beatings,"[69] which served as tangible 
evidence for the impact of the cooperative campaign by the 
true coalition forces: the U.S. government, 
military-industrial complex and mainstream media. 
 
     This racist attitude pervades the highest levels of 
military and government.  Bob Woodward writes that during 
sensitive negotiations with the Saudis before the U.S. was 
invited in, amongst Bush and his top advisers, "There was a 
pessimism in the group about the Arabs in general.  They 
could not be relied on."[70] 
 
                 Demonizing Saddam Hussein 
 
     In George Orwell's classic, 1984, Winston Smith's 
Oceania is (at first) at war with Eurasia, which is led by 
the Enemy of the People, Emmanuel Goldstein.  Goldstein was 
once one of the leading figures of the government Party of 
Oceania, but now "was the primal traitor, the earliest 
defiler of the Party's purity.  All subsequent crimes 
against the Party, all treacheries, acts of sabotage, 
heresies, deviations, sprang directly out of his 
teaching."[71] 
 
     Saddam Hussein, too, was once (and not very long ago) a 
welcomed member of the fold.  Prior to the August 2, 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, he was an ally and friend to the U.S. 
and the West, which armed and backed him in his eight-year 
war with Iran, from 1980-1988.  As early as 1975, The New 
York Times, for example, characterized Iraq as "pragmatic," 
and "cooperative," with credit for this shift going to 
Saddam's "personal strength."[72] During the Iran-Iraq war, 
western leaders went to extraordinary lengths to find 
excuses for Baghdad. 
 
     When an Iraqi warplane launched a French-made 
     missile that crippled the USS Stark, former U.S. 
     president Ronald Reagan not only quickly accepted 
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     Baghdad's explanation but added that it was Iran 
     (whose tankers were the targets) that was really 
     at fault.[73] 
 
As recently as November, 1989, the U.S. gave Iraq $1 billion 
in loan assurances, second only to Mexico, and became Iraq's 
largest trading partner.[74] 
 
     No longer.  On February 1, 1991, a political cartoon on 
the op-ed page of The New York Times titled "The descent of 
man," showed in descending order: Clark Gable, a gorilla, a 
monkey, a snake, and Saddam Hussein.[75] Hussein's rapid 
fall from glory as America's champion in the war with Iran 
has less to do with his (deserved) long-term reputation as a 
brutal dictator and murderer, than it does with the fact 
that, like Panama's General Manuel Noriega before him, he 
became more useful as an enemy than as a friend.  In this 
respect his position was similar to that of the 
democratically elected government of Iran, prior to the CIA 
sponsored coup (led by the father of General Norman 
Schwartzkopf) which installed the Shah of Iran in 1953. 
 
     In the spring of 1990, Iraq had massive debts of from 
$70 to $100 billion U.S., incurred during the Iran-Iraq war, 
including what it had hoped was $40 billion worth of 
forgivable loans from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.[76] OPEC set 
the price of oil at $18 per barrel in 1986, along with 
production quotas to maintain that price.  But Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates exceeded their quotas, driving the 
price down to around $13 in June 1990.[77] Meanwhile, Kuwait 
was exporting vast amounts of oil at the deflated price, 
some of which was being pumped from the Rumailah oilfield 
straddling the border and jointly-owned with Iraq.  This 
harmed Iraq's ability to recover financially from the war 
with Iran,[78] as oil constitutes 95 percent of Iraq's 
exports.  Hussein was desperate.  As The New York Times 
indicated on March 1, with the war safely over, "Iraq's 
near-empty treasury has been both a cause of war and an 
obstacle to its conclusion."  One former diplomat was quoted 
as saying, "They [Iraqis] were in a very tight condition 
financially, which is why we had the invasion" of 
Kuwait.[79] 
 
     On top of this, Iraq feared another Israeli or U.S. 
attack, as the U.S. was grumbling about Saddam's military 
buildup.  In a July 1990 meeting with April Glaspie, U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq, Saddam was reassured that border 
disputes between Iran and Kuwait were a local matter, and 
the U.S. would not intervene.  He may have interpreted this 
as a green light from the U.S., similar to that involved in 
his aggression against Iran. 
 
     Thus, the U.S. claims the right to defend its interests 
by force, according to the official view presented in 
justification of its invasion of Panama,[80] and as 
indicated by its very presence in the Persian Gulf.  Other 
leaders and countries which operate under the same 
philosophy are portrayed as the Antichrist. 
 
     This is some of the background to the invasion of 
Kuwait, not to be found in mainstream media bent on 
portraying Saddam as another "Hitler," or a madman whose 
ruthless acts are unsupported by rhyme or reason.  The Globe 
and Mail, for example, in an editorial titled: "The world 
unites against Saddam Hussein," commented on the day the war 
began that "The world faces war in the Middle East because 
of the intransigence of one man."[81] After the war, The 
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Globe commented, "The defeat of evil on the other side 
certainly justifies great satisfaction, as does the 
successful defence of important coalition interests."[82] 
Just as the ground war was coming to an end, The New York 
Times led off an editorial by proclaiming, "At every chance, 
Saddam Hussein has worked to make himself the most hated man 
in the world."[83] 
 
     In a television interview in mid-April, former U.S. 
President Richard Nixon called Hussein "an international 
menace," and said if he was still the president, he would 
have had Hussein killed. 
 
     If I could find a way to get him out of there, 
     even putting a contract out on him, if the CIA 
     still did that sort of a thing, assuming it ever 
     did, I would be for it.[84] 
 
     One of the most striking portrayals of Hussein was in 
The New York Post.  When Hussein used a video which included 
him shown patting the head of one of his child hostages, the 
newspaper ran a photo on its front page, with the screaming 
headline: "Child Abuser."[85] 
 
     All of which is not to say that Hussein is anything 
other than a vicious thug.  But as Noam Chomsky notes, 
"Saddam Hussein is a murderous gangster, just as he was 
before August 2, when he was an amiable friend and favored 
trading partner."[86] It is the hypocrisy, 
misrepresentation, and unnecessary death and destruction 
that rankles. 
 
                   The Terrorist Threat 
 
     A small army navy surplus store in Windsor, Ontario had 
a run on an unusual item -- gas masks.  Ultimately, they 
sold out.  For weeks, the North American media had been 
running stories on Israeli preparations for Saddam's use of 
chemical warfare.  Reporters' voices were muffled and 
camerapersons' vision blurred, as they followed instructions 
and sat in plastic-sealed rooms, wearing their gas masks, 
distributed free to Israelis by their government.  It took a 
court decision to force them to distribute the masks to 
Palestinians living in the West Bank as well.  Families 
provided guided tours to journalists, showing them their 
"safe" rooms, with the food stores and plastic lining.  The 
coverage intensified as the occasional Scud missile landed 
in Tel Aviv, or Haifa. 
 
     Scrambling for Gulf-related stories which can be 
"localized," the media reported on gas mask sales, and 
"terrorist" threats which seemingly were synonymous with 
mention of the word "Palestinian."  Symptomatic of the 
hysteria over terrorism, CBS anchor Dan Rather asked the FBI 
director whether Jewish Americans should send their children 
to school the next day.  Air travel was down.  People were 
buying gas masks, 20,000 kilometers away from the Middle 
East. 
 
     This scenario brings to mind a scene from Ray 
Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451, where the people are holed-up in 
their homes, watching on the video screens as the police 
search for terrorists. 
 
     Gas masks and air travel indicate that, like the media, 
the public managed to "localize" the Middle East crisis.  It 
seems reasonable to conclude that the real or imagined 
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terrorist threat served this purpose, while simultaneously 
heightening the demonization of Hussein and dehumanization 
of Iraqis and Arabs generally. 
 
                      The Iraqi War Machine 
 
     Exploiting the alleged "terrorist threat" was a major 
means of justifying the Gulf War, as was the emphasis on the 
chemical weapons threat, the mystique of the 
"battle-hardened," elite Republican Guard, and the portrayal 
of tiny Iraq -- a nation of 18 million with an economy 
devastated from eight years of war, and an army of 
conscripts -- as the "fourth largest army in the world." 
Prior to the ground war which began on February 24, the U.S. 
estimated the number of Iraqi troops in the "Kuwaiti theatre 
of operations" as 540,000, with some estimates rising as 
high as 1,000,000.  Afterwards, estimates were revised 
downwards to between 200,000 and 320,000.  "We'll never 
know, and it really doesn't matter," one U.S. 
Administration official said cavalierly.[87] Iraqi defenses 
of bunkers, fire pits, and minefields, "terrifyingly 
portrayed in newspaper graphics around the world," were 
"much less formidable in reality."[88] 
 
     Yet, the Pentagon kept silent beforehand about what 
they afterwards termed, the "hollow Iraqi threat."[89] In 
fact, just as Bush was calling a halt to the military 
offensive at the end of February, The New York Times was 
busy relaying Schwarzkopf's justification for the ground 
offensive. 
 
     A bold strike was needed, [Schwarzkopf] said, 
     because the Iraqis outnumbered the allies 3 to 2 
     overall and 2 to 1 in fighting forces, when the 
     offense classically needs a 3-to-1 superiority 
     over the defense.[90] 
 
     Terrorists have no scruples, so Saddam Hussein was 
expected to use chemical weapons on civilians.  Indeed, in 
the early days of the war with the first Scud attack on 
Israel, CBC national radio news reported that a mustard gas 
attack was underway.  In fact, the Americans were the only 
ones to use chemical warfare, in the form of napalm.  (Of 
course, we were told that it was only used to set fire to 
oil in ditches dug by the Iraqis to defend against tanks. 
We were to believe that all of the napalm, a deadly 
incendiary gel, fell on ditches rather than troops.)  The 
admitted use of napalm by the Americans was buried in the 
war coverage.[91] Contrast this with the prominent coverage 
afforded to charges by Shiite rebels that Iraqi government 
forces "massacred thousands of people in napalm attacks," in 
fighting following the war.  The coverage of the napalm 
issue also exemplified the media's predilection for favoring 
the military position, when contrasting views were 
available.[92] 
 
     Additionally, the so-called "Butcher of Baghdad" was 
supposedly responsible for other atrocities: such as the 
charge that 300 newborn Kuwaiti infants were killed in 
hospitals by invading Iraqis.  This charge was later denied 
by Kuwaitis, following their "liberation."[93] Unreported by 
the mainstream media was the fact that forty infants were in 
incubators, mothers at their sides, at Baghdad's Saddam 
Central Children's Hospital the night the U.S. bombs began 
to fall. 
 
     First the electricity went out.  With the thunder 
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     of war all around, the mothers were 
     panic-stricken.  In their desperation, they 
     grabbed their children and rushed them into the 
     basement.  Six hours later, 20 of the babies were 
     dead from lack of life support.[94] 
 
     Another aspect of this highly functional portrayal of 
Iraq involved "eco-terrorism," over the Gulf oil spills. 
Late in January, an oil slick was reported in the Persian 
Gulf.  The U.S. blamed Iraq for an intentional release of 
oil from Kuwaiti facilities.  Bush said Saddam's "scorched 
water strategy" was "kinda sick."[95] While much attention 
has been paid to Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti oil 
facilities, very little has been paid to the U.S. bombing of 
Iraqi oil refineries, rigs, tankers, and other targets, 
resulting in widespread spills.  U.S. bombers also knocked 
out the civilian water supply to major cities like Baghdad, 
bombed water purification plants, and operational nuclear 
facilities,[96] all bona fide acts of eco-terrorism. 
 
                     The Final Resort 
 
     In late January George Bush told the National 
Association of Religious Broadcasters that the Gulf War was 
a "last resort" after "extraordinary" diplomatic efforts had 
been tried and failed.[97] This was the U.S. 
administration's "diplomacy has failed" line, which usually 
was dutifully reported by the media.  The New York Times, 
for example, noted on January 20 that "now that diplomacy 
has failed and it has come to war...."[98] 
 
     In reality of course, the Bush administration blocked 
all efforts at reaching a peaceful settlement, while 
continuing to pay lip service to it.  The economic embargo 
was only in effect for five months, and was not given a 
chance (given, of course, the dubious assumption that "we" 
had the right to establish such an embargo in the first 
place).  Both Zbigniew Brzezinski and Admiral William Crowe, 
former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that 
the question was not whether the embargo would work, but 
whether the United States had the patience to let it work. 
The CIA reported in early December that the embargo was 
already seriously affecting the civilian economy, and Iraq's 
military could maintain its level of readiness for no more 
than nine months.  Noting this in The Globe and Mail, Morris 
Wolfe commented, "Unfortunately, Bush didn't have the 
'courage of patience,' to use Eisenhower's apt phrase."[99] 
 
     As early as August 12, 1990, Hussein offered to 
withdraw completely from Kuwait if others too would withdraw 
from occupied Arab lands: specifically, Syria from Lebanon, 
and Israel from the territories it conquered in 1967.  The 
Financial Times of London suggested that this offered "a 
path away from disaster ... through negotiation."  The Bush 
administration, however, dismissed it with utter 
derision.[100] So too did Barbara Walters of ABC's 
Nightline, who characterized Hussein's proposal as: "Unless 
you solve all the problems of the Middle East, we're going 
to stay in Kuwait."[101] 
 
     Hussein also offered to withdraw if an international 
conference were held on the Palestinian question.  On August 
23, Iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait and to allow 
foreigners to leave in return for the lifting of sanctions, 
guaranteed access to the Gulf, and full control of the 
Rumailah oil field.  Although a Mideast affairs specialist 
in the Bush administration described this proposal as 
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"serious" and "negotiable," the White House responded that 
it "had not been taken seriously because Mr. Bush demands 
the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait."[102] 
 
     When, in late February, Iraq agreed to a Soviet 
proposal for unconditional withdrawal over three weeks, even 
this was not adequate: it had to be done according to Bush's 
timeframe of one week.  Because the Soviet/Iraqi peace plan 
called for the removal of economic sanctions once the 
withdrawal was complete -- sanctions which only existed 
because of the invasion in the first place -- this was seen 
as a "conditional" peace offer, and hence unacceptable.[103] 
Of course, Soviet motives were also portrayed as 
suspect.[104] Bush's desire for a total military victory led 
him to reject the proposal, which failed only in its 
inability to match Bush's escalating demands.  Bush was 
uncompromising in that he offered no opportunity for Hussein 
to save face.  The New York Times commented, "American 
officials are confident that American and allied forces are 
on the verge of a decisive military victory and are seeking 
a peace settlement that is the political equivalent of a 
rout."[105] 
 
     Opposition to Bush's hard-line stance was non-existent 
in the mainstream media.  For example, Democratic House 
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt was quoted as saying that, 
"The president spoke this morning for the entire country 
when he reiterated our insistence on an immediate withdrawal 
by Iraq."[106] 
 
     In Canada, William Thorsell of The Globe and Mail 
celebrated the use of force, rather than a peaceful 
resolution.  "We did a lot of things right in managing this 
conflict," he wrote.  "We were not distracted by Mr. 
Hussein's last-minute efforts to extract political points in 
defeat through a negotiated settlement."[107] Far better to 
mete out death and destruction than to allow "political 
points." 
 
     In keeping with the U.S. administration's aim to "kick 
the Vietnam Syndrome," thousands of peace demonstrations 
went virtually unreported.  When they received any coverage, 
peace activists were portrayed as unreasonable hysterics and 
fanatical leftists.  The media referred to the "anti-war 
rhetoric" of the "peaceniks," as contrasted with the 
"technical analysis" provided by the generals.[108] 
 
                The Limited Range of Debate 
 
     Much of the above describes the limited range of the 
debate carried in the mainstream media.  But how did the 
media conduct and portray the debate over their own role in 
covering the war?  Some attention was given to broader 
issues, such as media complicity, oil interests, and 
economic imperatives.[109] But just about all of the 
navel-gazing and criticism was of the "safe," conformist 
variety.[110] For example, CBC radio's Media File (now 
defunct), which in many respects provided an unusually 
diverse service, presented the views of two journalism 
professors.  The "critical" one argued that the media 
behaved irresponsibly, by reporting inaccurately in their 
rush to be first with the news.  The "fawning" one argued 
that criticism arises out of print journalists' envy of TV, 
which can provide "history in real time," where you can "see 
the facts," and "see a Patriot missile destroy a Scud." 
Hence, despite the inaccuracies, getting the news to 
consumers fast is worth it. 
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     The extremely safe and non-threatening criticism found 
on Media File demonstrates how the mainstream media 
generally preclude critical perspectives.  Not only is the 
content distorted, but the discussion of that distorted 
content itself is confined to the very limited perspective 
of "two sides,"[111] (of the same coin) fulfilling the need 
for "balance" and the myth of "objectivity."  Despite 
occasional references in the media to some of the issues and 
viewpoints outlined above, the vast infotainment glut on the 
Gulf War followed the Bush agenda as faithfully as any 
Ministry of Propaganda. 
 
     To do otherwise would be to exceed what Chomsky calls, 
"The Bounds of the Expressible" which, again, illustrate the 
genius of "brainwashing under freedom."  The distinction 
drawn by Chomsky parallels Gramsci's notion of "civil 
society" versus "political society," with the former 
characterized as "private," "hegemonic" and operating by 
"consensus," while the latter is the State, which uses 
"direct domination and force."  Ultimately Gramsci argued 
that the political society subsumes the civil.[112] 
Referring to the Vietnam context, Chomsky wrote: 
 
     In a totalitarian system, it is required only that 
     official doctrine be obeyed.  In the democratic 
     systems of thought control, it is deemed necessary 
     to take over the entire spectrum of discussion: 
     nothing must remain thinkable apart from the Party 
     Line.  State propaganda is often not expressed, 
     merely presupposed as the framework for discussion 
     among right-minded people.  The debate, there- 
     fore, must be between the "doves" and "hawks," the 
     Schlesingers and the Alsops.  The position that 
     the US is engaged in aggression, and that such 
     aggression is wrong, must remain unthinkable and 
     unexpressed.[113] 
 
            Authorized Knowers and Common Sense 
 
     Like Vietnam before it, the Gulf War was fought to 
preserve global economic interests (a topic which is 
addressed in the next section).  The mass media, as we have 
seen, function as the delivery system for elite ideology. 
As indicated above, the result is what Herman and Chomsky 
have termed the "doctrinal consensus," which is "based on 
serviceability to important domestic power interests."[114] 
Fundamental to this consensus is "the subordination of the 
media to the requirements of the state propaganda 
system."[115] Obviously, this is a complex topic about which 
numerous authors have written numerous books.  Our goal here 
is to focus on two related aspects of this situation, as 
they apply to the media role in the Gulf War: the use of 
authorized knowers, and the development of a "common sense" 
perspective. 
 
     As they do on a daily basis, during the Gulf War the 
media exercised a form of self-censorship by relying 
extensively, if not exclusively, on what has been 
characterized as "elite authorized knowers."[116] As 
generalists, newsworkers rely on specialist sources for the 
quotes, opinions and interpretations contained in their 
ostensibly "objective" stories.  Indeed, the myth of 
objectivity, which is still pervasive in journalism, 
although increasingly expressed in terms such as "balance," 
or "neutrality," is one of the underlying driving forces 
behind the use of official sources.[117] Unable to overtly 
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opine themselves, given the pretext of objectivity,[118] 
journalists, editors, and producers actively frame their 
stories and then seek out sources who will support their 
perspective.  They also allow themselves to be willing 
conduits for their sources. 
 
     The sources relied upon overwhelmingly tend to be 
official in nature: politicians, corporate leaders, 
academics, members of "nonpartisan" think-tanks, and so on. 
One 30-month study at the University of Minnesota, for 
example, looked at the three major U.S. networks. 
 
     Correspondents and producers established a pattern 
     of returning time and again to a very small group 
     of the same experts...  They tend to be men rather 
     than women, East Coasters rather than West, and 
     Republicans (along with a few conservative 
     Democrats) rather than critics of the political 
     establishment.  Also favored by television news 
     are ex-government officials (mostly from 
     Republican administrations) and "scholars" from 
     conservative Washington D.C. think tanks who 
     appear to be more steeped in political 
     partisanship than in academic credentials.[119] 
 
Leon Sigal found that U.S. government officials made up 
almost half of all sources cited in stories beginning on 
page one of The New York Times and The Washington Post.[120] 
A content analysis of the three Toronto papers indicated 
that from 80 to 90 percent of the stories reflected 
"official news" such as government coverage, press 
conferences, speeches, press releases, crime and the courts, 
rather than coverage stemming from the newspapers' own 
initiative.[121] 
 
     The use of authorized knowers helps to maintain the 
image of objectivity, and protects the media from charges of 
bias.  It makes journalists' work easier; rather than 
reading that lengthy tome you've written, they merely ask 
you to sum it up in a sentence or two.  We saw this in the 
Gulf War, where journalists ostensibly covering "the war," 
were ensconced in hotel rooms hundreds of kilometers from 
the action, wearing army fatigues and watching press 
conferences on television.  The use of retired generals and 
other military experts was pervasive.  Moreover, the media 
hung on every official word spoken by Defense Secretary Dick 
Cheney, Colin Powell of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gulf 
forces commander Norman Schwartzkopf, George Bush, etc. 
 
     Yet, the media/source relationship is symbiotic. 
Sources make newsworkers' jobs easier, while media deliver 
sources' propaganda, free of charge and with an added 
credibility component.  When George Bush says we've kicked 
the Vietnam syndrome, the public may remain skeptical, but 
it's likely that skepticism will wear down under the 
constant repetition by The New York Times, the television 
news, and so forth.  In short, as Ericson, et al. sum it up, 
the news is "framed so as to translate sources' politically 
interested views into a seemingly apolitical, no-nonsense, 
common-sense view."[122] 
 
     This common sense view is in certain respects, with 
apologies to Walter Lippmann, the picture we carry around in 
our heads.  It is a type of conventional wisdom, which is 
inherent in one's world view, for example, the view that 
communism is bad, or that capitalism is synonymous with 
democracy, or indeed the notion of a Vietnam syndrome 
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discussed earlier, and just what this is.[123] Stuart Hall 
argues that such "preferred codes" as these: 
 
     have been rendered invisible by the process of 
     ideological masking and taking-for-granted.... 
     They seem to be, even to those who employ and 
     manipulate them for the purposes of encoding, 
     simply the "sum of what we already know."[124] 
 
Given our limited first-hand exposure to world events, 
journalists play a crucial role in formulating our common 
sense perspectives.  As Ericson, et al. note, "His (sic) is 
the power of news transformation, constructing as part of 
the common sense what most people do not know 
otherwise."[125] 
 
     As was the case with Vietnam, Panama, Nicaragua, 
Grenada, Tripoli, and a myriad of international and national 
events before them, this is the legacy of the Gulf War. 
 
     [News] shapes not only our knowledge of the world, 
     but also our knowledge of how to know.  In 
     transforming the bureaucratic knowledge of other 
     social controllers into the common sense, 
     journalists are simultaneously providing citizens 
     with a means not to know.[126] 
 
This then is the crux of the epistemological problem for 
those prominently displaying their flags and yellow ribbons, 
the patriots Bush described as heroes without uniforms: They 
neither know, nor know how to know. 
 
           The U.S. -- Mercenaries to the World 
 
     Elements of an alternative perspective on the Gulf War 
have been outlined above.  What's missing is an answer to 
the "why" question: why did the Bush administration 
perpetrate this war?  Implicitly, we've rejected the 
conventional explanation that it was to "liberate Kuwait," 
or as an ingenious placard held by demonstrator Robert 
Letcher in the January 26 Washington demonstration put it, 
to "Restore Kuwait's Legitimate Dictator!" 
 
     Of course, the so-called "wimp factor" undoubtedly 
played a role, as Bush evidently found this label to be 
quite disconcerting, and probably relished the thought of 
shedding it for good.[127] The immediate aftermath indicated 
that this worked, as The New York Times commented: "The war 
provided a clarity and passion to Mr. Bush's leadership that 
had been missing.  He seemed more focused, more constant in 
purpose, and less a chameleon of public opinion. . . . Mr. 
Bush appeared to be acting from strong, unequivocal 
beliefs."[128] An added bonus is his subsequent rise in the 
polls, and attainment of a support rating in excess of 90 
percent: even higher than it was following the Panama 
invasion and operation "Just Cause."  Within days, The Times 
was expounding on his excellent re-election chances.[129] 
But much more was at stake than George Bush's personal pride 
or political future. 
 
     Economist Tom Riddell argues that throughout the 
post-World War II period, the U.S. has functioned as a 
global police force.  War, or the threat of war, has been 
used by the multinational corporate elite to protect their 
national and global economic interests.  Hence, both old and 
new "world orders," or the U.S. sphere of influence, in 
Chomsky's terms, has consisted of the following: 
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     The promotion of international trade; open access 
     to markets, raw materials, cheap labor, and 
     investment opportunities; and a set of trading and 
     financial institutions that primarily benefited 
     multinational corporations and the already 
     developed countries. [It promotes] profitability 
     and economic growth.  Military assistance to 
     cooperative regimes, global military power, and 
     frequent interventions were used to reinforce this 
     order and to support U.S. hegemony within it. ... 
     War, then, is the ultimate prop for the global 
     capitalist system under U.S. leadership, when 
     power itself is insufficient to determine the 
     course of events and relationships.  In this 
     sense, the U.S. intervention in the Middle East is 
     about protecting access to oil, preserving jobs 
     (Baker), and continuing the "American way of life" 
     (Bush).[130] 
 
     In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. military 
establishment is facing drastic cutbacks.  With Satan 
himself (a "communist" USSR) no longer around to justify 
exorbitant military expenditures on "defense," it becomes 
necessary to invent new enemies, some of whom may be former 
friends and allies, such as Panama's Manuel Noriega, or 
Saddam Hussein.  The unsavory alternative is to reduce 
military spending, possibly diverting the funding to social 
programs, and towards the huge federal deficit, estimated at 
$300 billion for 1991. 
 
     Bush chose to use the enormous military expenditures to 
relieve the economic depression, all the while reducing 
spending on social programs.  The beauty of this approach is 
that the costs of the war have been more than paid for by 
foreign pledges -- so, the U.S. global police force is 
actually mercenaries!  The Saudis, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, Japan, Germany, and Korea have pledged from $40 to 
$50 billion to the war effort, a total which it was 
estimated would finance the war for three months.[131] Since 
the war lasted for less than two months, it turns out to be 
profitable for the military, as well as the corporations 
falling over themselves to rebuild Kuwait.  (With preference 
going to American companies, and bidders pre-ranked 
according to their national war effort.)  Or as The Times 
put it, with "the Kuwaiti policy of favoring the ally that 
has done the most fighting."[132] 
 
     Just as the ground war was coming to an end, The Times 
reported that: 
 
     In the rush for postwar business deals, American 
     companies have won about 70 percent of the roughly 
     200 contracts signed so far, worth more than $800 
     million.[133] 
 
By February 28, 1991, we learned that the U.S.  Army Corps 
of Engineers had a $45 million contract to "help manage the 
recovery program" in the first 90 days after the war.  That 
is, the army arranged contracts for U.S. businesses said to 
be "burning up the phones" with eagerness to get in on the 
rebuilding.[134] Total U.S. trade with Kuwait for the first 
five months of 1991 was $1.5 billion; the total for all of 
1989 was $53 million.[135] Who says war doesn't pay? 
 
     Thus Bush was at least potentially able to deliver on 
his promise not to raise taxes to finance the Gulf War -- he 
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didn't need to, it was financed abroad.  Of course, with the 
ground war pending and victory at hand, he immediately asked 
Congress for $15 billion.[136] 
 
     The question that occurs is, if the U.S. and other 
countries were willing to spend all of this money waging 
war, and if Iraq's dire economic straits were a major 
contributing factor in its invasion of Kuwait in the first 
place, why weren't financial arrangements simply made, such 
as forgiving some of the Iraqi debts to Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia?  Why wasn't there a negotiated settlement?  Chomsky 
argues that the U.S. blocked the diplomatic track because it 
didn't want the crisis defused at the cost of a few token 
gains for Iraq: no outcome would be tolerated other than 
Iraqi capitulation to U.S. force.[137] 
 
     In mid-August, 1991, we learned from a Congressional 
report that U.S. weapons sales to the Third World more than 
doubled in 1990, to $18.5 billion, from $8 billion in 1989. 
This includes $14.5 billion in U.S. weapons for Saudi 
Arabia, most of which was supplied after the invasion of 
Kuwait.  Additionally, the report said, "The White House is 
planning to ask Congress for another massive weapons sale to 
Saudi Arabia of some $14.5 billion in fighters, tanks and 
other arms."[138] 
 
     This may go a long way toward explaining why the war 
took place, when economic sanctions were "working."  Still, 
the answer to the "why" question is evidently complex, and 
has already been the sole subject of several lengthy 
articles.  In his analysis, Colin Gordon sums up the reasons 
for the war as the U.S.  "Acting on traditional and mundane 
concerns for the stability of commodity markets and world 
trade, and for its credibility as a world power."[139] But 
whether or not this is entirely true, or the entire truth, 
it is evident that the public justifications proffered by 
Bush were just plain drivel, yet were swallowed wholesale by 
the media. 
 
     A final word must be said about the plight of the 
Kurdish refugees.  As Edward Herman noted, 
 
     There has even been a tilt back in [Hussein's] 
     favor as a counterweight to more fearsome local 
     nationalist extremists.  The fact that Bush 
     repeatedly urged the Iraqis to overthrow the 
     tyrant, and then stood by while the tyrant 
     slaughtered them, I have seen mentioned only in 
     Doug Ireland's column in the Village Voice.[140] 
 
The Kurdish people have paid an enormous price for the U.S. 
administration's successful efforts to thwart Iraqi 
democracy.[141] But such "nationalist extremists" of course 
represent a greater threat to U.S. interests than do brutal 
dictators. 
 
                        Conclusions 
 
     As stated at the outset, my goals for this paper have 
been twofold: first, to demonstrate how the media presented 
a united front on the political, economic, and military 
goals of the Persian Gulf War; and second, to delineate the 
hidden corporate or State apparatus interests which were not 
posed by the media and which are fundamental to a 
counter-hegemonic perspective. 
 
     This analysis identifies the mainstream media's role in 
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the Gulf War as both a cohesive and integral part of the 
State apparatus, or what I have termed simply "the Bush 
administration."  There is very strong, if not unequivocal, 
evidence for Gramsci's "unison of economic and political 
aims," as well as "intellectual and moral unity," in this 
reading of media reportage. 
 
     Consequently, insofar as this case study is concerned, 
there is an obvious choice between the competing theories of 
"normative consensus," represented by political economy, and 
the "media pluralism" of U.S. cultural studies, with the 
former strongly favored over the latter.  Diversity of 
content was restricted almost entirely to alternative media, 
notorious for their limited readership.  The occasional 
exceptions which found their way into the consciousness 
industry outlets were "engulfed." 
 
     Despite his pre-eminent position as representative of 
the British school of cultural studies (which differs 
significantly from the American variant), Stuart Hall has 
provided the following explanation for what he terms the 
"pivotal and commanding notion of hegemony": 
 
     The "definitions of reality" favourable to the 
     dominant class ... come to constitute the primary 
     "lived reality" as such for the subordinate 
     classes.  In this way ideology provides the 
     "cement" in a social formation, "preserving the 
     ideological unity of the entire social bloc." 
     This operates, not because the dominant classes 
     can prescribe and proscribe, in detail, the mental 
     content of the lives of subordinate classes ... 
     but because they strive and to a degree succeed in 
     framing all competing definitions of reality 
     within their range, bringing all alternatives 
     within their horizon of thought.[142] 
 
Mainstream media framing of the Gulf War thus succeeded in 
limiting reality to within the "common sense" range of the 
dominant ideology. 
 
     Some would defend the media with the excuse that they 
were censored, and thus had no choice.  This simply doesn't 
hold water.  Censorship doesn't prevent the asking of 
questions, it merely inhibits the provision of some answers. 
The alternative media, which continued questioning and 
seeking answers and context, portrayed a very different 
picture of events, all the while suffering from even greater 
censorship.  Additionally, if the problem were limited to 
one of censorship, then the media would have altered their 
portrayal since the war ended.  This has largely not 
happened.  Thus, a form of self-censorship may be identified 
as the major problem, and the albeit existent military 
censorship merely afforded a convenient scapegoat.  In 
blaming the military, the mainstream media reinforced the 
common sense mythology of a pluralistic power structure and 
the "normal" objectivity of the media.  In the process, the 
separate reality recounted herein was virtually excluded 
from what journalist A.J.  Liebling called, "a monovocal, 
monopolistic, monocular press." 
 
     Finally, this brings us to the debate both between the 
cultural studies variants and between political economy and 
cultural studies, over the "effects" on audiences.  While 
this is not an "effects" study, certain inferences have been 
made about resultant audience attitudes and behavior, such 
as the ubiquitous yellow ribbons and flag-waving; the 
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disregard and even intolerance for anything remotely 
constituting criticism of the war effort.  It is my position 
that this anecdotal evidence, buttressed by polls which 
showed overwhelming support for both Bush and the war, 
points to the success of the media as a hegemonic apparatus 
to the state.  The effects, such as they were, may not have 
been monolithic, any more than was the media content (the 
U.S. use of napalm was reported on the front page of The New 
York Times, after all), but both might be accurately 
described as "overwhelming."  We will leave the final word 
to Stuart Hall, who notes, 
 
     Audiences, whose decodings will inevitably reflect 
     their own material and social conditions, will not 
     necessarily decode events within the same 
     ideological structures as those in which they have 
     been encoded.  But the overall intention of 
     "effective communication" must, certainly, be to 
     "win the consent" of the audience to the preferred 
     reading, and hence to get him [sic] to decode 
     within the hegemonic framework.  Even when 
     decodings are not made through a "perfect 
     transmission," within the hegemonic framework, the 
     great range of decodings will tend to be 
     'negotiations' within the dominant codes -- giving 
     them a more situational inflexion -- rather than 
     systematically decoding them in a 
     counter-hegemonic way.[143] 
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